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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CLARK A. ROSS, NICHOLAS G. 
SI-IAHEEN, HUGH V. BIRD, GLEN 
vV. CROSBY, ELLIS A. SHAHEEN, 




PRODUCERS ~fUTUAL INSURANCE . No. 8394 
COM:PANY, PRODUCERS FINANCE 
COMPANY OF UTAH, WENDEL A. 
DAVIS, RICHARD G. JOHNSON, 
ERNEST A. RICHARDS, GEORGE R. 
REEDER, DAVID A. RUSSELL and 
NINA B. DAVIS, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants were policy holders of the Producers 
Mutual Insurance Co1npany, hereinafter referred to 
throughout this brief as "Producers". Each of the 
plaintiffs has lapsed his policy. 
Appellants set out in their A1nended Co1nplaint that 
Producers sold a life insurance policy deno1ninated 
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''Founders Participating Policy", \vhich they advertised 
as an "individual or family whole life policy", and as a 
part of the plan of selling said policy they prepared an 
application for the purchase of insurance to be attached 
to the policy, and in connection with the sale of the 
policy executed a Trust Agreen1ent which provided that 
the purchaser of insurance should assign the dividends 
fro1n the insurance to trustees "\Vho should use the divi-
dends for the purchase of stock in Producers Finance 
Company, a company to be for1ned. That in addition to 
the premium on the policy, as set forth the1ein, each 
insured paid a fee for life membership of $5.00. That 
on Septe1nber 4, 1953, the Department of Business Regu-
lation, through the Insurance Department, issued an 
order to Producers to cease and desist within ten days 
from selling shares of stock in connection with or as an 
inducement to the sale of insurance. That an appeal 
was taken fro1n the order to the Third Judicial District 
Court where the order was upheld, and that thereafter 
an appeal was taken from the judgment of the District 
Court to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah where 
the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. Ap-
pellants also allege nu1nerous other violations of the 
insurance code - that there was discrimination in favor 
of certain individual or classes, that the Founders Par-
ticipating Policy is a five year term policy, instead of 
a whole life policy as represented, that the premium 
charged was excessive, that a major portion of the 
excess was used in paying excessive salaries, commis-
sions and expenses to officers and agents, and that Pro-
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ducers had failed to return the excess pre1niu1n collected. 
The Amended Co1nplaint alleges as a final con-
clusion that by reason of the foregoing the Founders 
Participating Policy and Trust Agreement executed in 
connection therewith were null and void ab initio, and 
that, therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to the return of 
all premiun1s paid to Producers, together with interest. 
To the foregoing Amended Complaint respondents 
filed a Motion to Dismiss upon the ground that the 
amended complaint does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
The matter was argued to the Court, and the Court 
entered an order that appellants' Amended Complaint 
be dismissed. Appellant then asked for a re-hearing 
and upon the conclusion of the re-hearing the Court 
again granted the motion. 
A third time the n1atter was heard with a. different 
approach and with different argument presented by 
appellants. The trial court again granted respondents' 
motion. The discussion which took place bet"'~een Coun-
sel for appellants, and the Court reflects the proceedings 
in the trial court. The following quotations are from 
pages 25, 26, 27 of the record: 
"Mr. Draper: Just this one observation and I am 
through. This matter was presented to 
the Insurance Comn1issioner. He had a 
plain duty to revoke their license and he 
merely enjoined then1. 
The Court: Well, I had that thought while you 
were arguing. If this Company is violat-
ing these statutes, as you indicate, and it 
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is the dutv of the Conunissioner to revoke 
their licen.,se, or take son1e other penalizing 
action against the1n, he has no discretion 
about it and if you \Vere here for a writ of 
mandate directing him to do it on a clear 
cut situation there would be no question, 
it seems to me, about it. Of course that 
is another thing and isn't what seems to be 
before me. All through your argument I 
was impressed with the idea that this see1ns 
to be a matter for the Commissioner. Now 
seeing you have got, we will say, a violation 
of ten or twelve statutes here it just makes 
it all the more aggravated and arouses the 
anger of the Court, or anybody that has 
to pass on it. If that makes it bad where 
is the violation' Is it after the violation 
of one statute, or after the violation of 
four or five, or a dozen. There would be 
a line of demarcation there where the poli-
cy becomes void and the thing should be 
declared so by the Court, or it should be 
enforced by the Insurance Commissioner. 
Mr. Draper: That is what happened in the Moun-
tain States case. The Commissioner ab-
solutely threw us out and continued to is-
sue license to the company. The Supreme 
Court revoked its licenses. 
The Court: That is a thought on that case. It 
didn't declare the policies void, either. 
Mr. Draper: No, that wasn't asked for. The 
whole matter was laid before the Com-
missioner. He has got those facts before 
him. The matter was presented to him 
and he starts an injunctive procedure. He 
exceeds his authority in licensing this com-
pany. 
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The Court: After all, it is his duty to license 
these co1npanies. Now if you were here to 
have a policy declared void that, of course, 
is one thing. But just as "\Ve discussed in 
other hearings, and I think Mr. Iverson 
had ample authority on this 1natter that 
these policies are not void. The violation 
of the statute has its only penalty in the 
suspension of the license, or revocation of 
the license and I can see for the Court to 
say these policies are void because they 
violate ten or twenty statutes that certainly 
isn't the answer to it. 
Mr. Draper : The one statute said if they do dis-
criminate in the·, 1nanner stated the policies 
are invalid. 
The Court: Mr. Iverson concedes that the pro-
visions for the sale of stock are void. But 
the thing you want to say, or want me to 
say, is that these policies are void. 
Mr. Draper: I keep saying this is 1ny last, but 
if the statute says that a provision which 
discriminates is invalid and the provision 
says you must not sell stock with insurance 
and you put those together how can there 
be any insurance or any company at all if 
you invoke the penalty of invalidity. 
The Court: That is just the proposition. Where 
is the line of demarcation between a valid 
policy and a void policy in a statute which 
carries its own penalty~ 
Mr. Draper: If the Co1n1nissioner has a clear 
duty to declare it void and fails to do it 
that is where the Courts con1e in. 
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The Court: There is no duty about that and they 
come in either by doing it themselves or 
de1nanding through a writ. Well, I fail to 
see any change in your position here from 
what the case was to begin with. I think 
it is a matter for the Insurance Commis-
sioner so far as the regulation of this com-
pany is concerned, and I don't believe it 
is my duty or any other court's duty to 
declare these policies void because there 
was one or numerous violations of this 
statute. For that reason the defendant's 
motion to dismiss will be granted and I 
take it Mr. Iverson, that this pretty well 
covers your other motion to strike, doesn't 
it'" 
ARGUMENT 
The question \\7hich is decisive of this whole matter 
is: Were the policies issued to appellants void ab initio~ 
All other questions involved in this case are important 
only insofar as they contribute to the answer to this 
question. 
Appellants in their Brief have included many mat-
ters which are irnmaterial, and do not contribute to the 
answer to the question above mentioned. Numerous 
sections of the Insurance Code are cited, which from a 
mere reading of the sa1ne make it apparent that the 
violation thereof could not result in rendering the poli-
cies void. The only matters argued in Appellants' Brief 
which could possibly affect this result are the matters 
involving want of mutuality of the insurance contracts, 
illegality thereof, the ultra vires nature thereof, or dis-
crimination in the sale thereof. 
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The respondents, therefore, will discuss this n1atter 
on the following points: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
ALLEGED VIOLATION·S OF NUMEROUS SEC·TIONS OF 
THE INSURANCE CODE CITED BY APPELLANTS ARE 
IMMATERIAL. 
POINT II. 
THE POLI·CIES OF INSURANCE ISSUED TO APPEL-
LANTS WERE NOT VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE OF WANT 
OF MU·TUALITY AND APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED 
TO RETURN OF PREMIUM PAID ON THE GROUND OF 
WANT OF MUTUALITY. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RETURN OF 
PREMIUMS PAID WITH INTEREST BECAUSE THE POLI-
CIES ISSUED WERE ULTRA VIRES. 
POINT IV. 
THE POLICIES ISSUED ·TO APPELLANTS WERE NOT 
VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE OF ILLEGALITY OR DIS-
CRIMINATION AND APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED 
TO RETURN OF PREMIUMS PAID UPON THE GROUND 
THA·T SAID POLICIES WERE VOID AB INITIO. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS O·F NUMEROUS SECTIONS OF 
THE INSUR.ANCE CODE CITED BY APPELLANTS ARE 
IMMATERIAL. 
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Appellants cite the following provi~ions of the In-
surance Code and allege violations thereof: 31-1-11; 31-
27-22; 31-7-12; 31-19-24; 31-13-24; and 31-7-10. A rnere 
reading of these sections will disclose that a violation of 
any one thereof, or all taken together, would not affect 
the policies sold to appellants or would not require the 
court to declare the policies of insurance sold to appel-
lants void ab initio. As a sample of such sections re-
spondents cite the following: 
Section 31-7-12: 
"No person having any authority in the in~ 
vestment or disposition of the funds of a domes-
tic insurer shall * * * be the beneficiary of any 
fee * '* * or other emolument because of any in-
vestment, loan, deposit * * * or exchange made 
by or for the insurer, or be pecuniarily interested 
therein in any capacity." 
Nor does it require any argument that the violation 
of Section 31-19-18, quoted at page 25 of Appellants' 
Brief could not have that effect. Said section is as fol-
lows: 
"No insurer * * * shall make any contract of 
insurance or agreement as to such contract, other 
than is plainly expressed in the policy issued 
thereon. Any such understanding or agreement 
not so expressed shall be invalid." 
It is obvious that the contract of insurance which violates 
this section is not rendered invalid. It is only the under-
standing or agreernent not expressed therein which shall 
be invalid. This provision is the common provision con-
tained in so many contracts, that any understanding or 
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agreernent not contained therein shall not be binding up-
on the parties. However, such an agree1nent does not 
invalidate the rnultitude of contracts which contain this 
prOVISIOn. 
Certainly the policy would not be rendered void by 
reason of any violation of Section 31-19-24, set forth at 
length at page 26 of Appellants' Brief as follows: 
"(2) No person shall wilfully collect as prerniu1n 
for insurance any sum in excess of the 
amount actually expended or in due course 
is to be expended for insurance applicable 
to the subject on account of which the 
premium was collected. 
" ( 3) The excess collected shall be returned to 
the person entitled thereto within a reason-
able length of time. 
H ( 4) Each violation of this section shall consti-
tute a misdemeanor." 
It is obvious frorn the rnere reading of the section 
that the policy is not void, or the whole prernium would 
be returnable, not the excess. This is typical of the 
other sections cited by appellants as having been vio-
lated. It is the regulation of just such 1natters that the 
Insurance Comrnissioner is given authority to supervise. 
It is apparent from reading the Insurance Code that 
the legislature intended to render insurance policies 
valid, if possible, and not invalid for violations of various 
sections of the Code. In this connection respondents 
call attention to the following sections as typical: 31-19-
35; 31-19-19; 31-19-18; and 31-19-16. 
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Section 31-19-35 provides: 
"Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement 
hereafter issued and otherwise valid, which con-
tains any condition or provision not in compliance 
of the requirements of this code shall not be ren-
dered invalid thereby, but shall be construed and 
applied in accordance with such conditions and 
provisions as would have applied had such policy, 
rider or endorsement been in full compliance with 
this code." 
Section 31-19-19 provides: 
" ( 1) No insurance contract delivered or 
issued for delivery in this state and covering sub-
jects located, resident, or to be performed in this 
state, shall contain any condition, stipulation or 
agreement (a) requiring it to be construed ac-
cording to the laws of any other state or country 
except as necessary to meet the requirements of 
the motor vehicle financial responsibility laws of 
such other state or country; or (b) depriving 
courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action 
against the insurer; or (c) limiting any action 
against the insurer * * *. 
" ( 2) Any such condition, stipulation, or 
agreement shall be void, but such voiding shall 
not affect the validity of the other provisions of 
the contract." 
POINT II. 
THE POLI·CIES OF INSURANCE ISSUED TO APPEL-
LANTS WERE NOT V'OID AB INITIO BECAUSE OF WANT 
OF MU·TUALITY AND APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED 
TO RETURN OF PREMIUM PAID ON THE GROUND OF 
WANT OF MUTUALITY. 
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Appellants contend that because the application for 
the insurance policies issued to the1n provided that the 
insureds agreed to exchange their policies in I)roducers 
for policies in Producers Life Insurance Con11Jany after 
the fifth anniversary of the policy there was a lack of 
1nutuality of obligation between Producers and the ap-
pellants, and that because thereof no contract existed be-
tween appellants and Producers. Therefore, appellants 
contend that said policies were void and appellants are 
entitled to a return of their consideration. 
The policies do not lack mutuality. For the period 
that the premiums were paid Producers furnished protec-
tion to appellants, and had any of the appellants died 
during said period, the face amount of the policies would 
have been paid to their beneficiaries. All of the appel-
lants lapsed their policies by failure to pay premiums 
within the five-year period. The only argument that can 
be made that there was lack of mutuality would be that 
at the expiration of five years the protection would be 
furnished by another company rather than Producers. 
This agreement constitutes a condition subsequent, that 
is, at the expiration of five years the protection was to be 
furnished by Producers Life Insurance Company instead 
of Producers Mutual upon the irnplied condition that 
Producers Life would accept the liability as well as the 
premiums to be paid. This Producers Life has not done 
and Producers, the respondent, has already agreed to 
continue the policies in force, furnishing cash surrender 
and non-forfeiture values beyond the five-year period. 
These 1natters have been subrnitted to and approved by 
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12 
the Insurance Connnissioner of the State of LTtah, and 
the cash surrender values and other benefits have been 
furnished to all insureds who have continued their poli-
cies in force to date. Thus, if there was any want of 
1nutuality in the inception of the policies, which Pro-
ducers does not concede, this rnatter has been rectified 
within the five-year period. 
However, Producers does not concede that there was 
a want of rnutuality during the period from the issuances 
of the policies until the fifth year. So long as there 
was consideration for the premiums paid, which was 
furnished in this case by furnishing protection to the 
insureds and by paying dividends each year after the 
first year, there is no want of mutuality. 
The matter of rnutuality is discussed in 1 Williston 
on Contracts 504, Section 141, where the author states: 
"It is often stated, as if it were a requisite 
in the formation of contracts that there must be 
mutuality. This form of statement is likely to 
cause confusion and however limited is at best an 
unnecessary way of stating that there must be 
valid consideration. In unilateral contracts there 
is never mutuality of obligation, and in bilateral 
agreements though it is necessary that there shall 
be such a pron1ise on each side as will furnish suf-
ficient consideration, to express the idea by say-
ing that rnutuality is necessary, is sure to cause 
confusion with the use of the same words by 
courts of equity. Lack of mutuality, as that 
phrase is used by courts of equity, is not neces-
sarily any objection to the existence of a contract 
* * *. That particular error which is traceable 
to the misleading use of the word 'mutuality' as 
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a requiren1ent for the forn1ation of contracts, is a 
tendency observable in some cases to hold a con-
tract invalid because the obligation undertaken 
upon one side is not commensurate with that 
undertaken on the other." 
The recent case of N ortohwestern E}ngineering Co. v. 
Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397; 10 NW (2d) 879, discusses this 
proposition. 
The Court in the case of Warner v. Channell Chem. 
Co., 121 Wash. 237; 208 Pac. 1104, states: 
"Mutuality, as applied to a contract, means 
consideration, and, as we have seen, there was 
here, expressed in the contract and actually pass-
1 
ed by performance, ample consideration for the 
optional right to continue. A contract, to be bind-
ing, need not be reciprocal as to each and every 
distinct covenant contained therein." 
The same court in the case of Lloyd v. American 
Can Co., 128 Wash. 298; 222 Pac. 876, states the rule as 
follows: 
~'Any contract containing a consideration is 
enforceable, whether it is otherwise mutual or not. 
A promise from one party is sufficient to sup-
port that from another. Indeed, n1utual promises 
are but a certain form of consideration." 
The case of Wood & Co. v. Van Deursen, et al., 122 
Okla. 19, 250 Pac. 524, is in point. The Court in that case 
stated: 
" 'A contract does not lack rnutuality because 
every obligation is not rnet by an equivalent coun-
ter obligation, because, where the act of one de-
pends upon the act of the other, an obligation to 
allow the thing necessary for the cornpletion of 
the contract is necessarily irnplied.'" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
To the san1e effect is the decision of the 1\!xas Su-
preine C~ourt in the case of Texas Seed & Floral Co . . ,. 
Chicago Set & Seed Co., 187 S.\,T. 747. 
The rule as stated in the next t'vo eases supra is to 
the effect that it is iinplied that an obligation necessary 
for the cornpletion of the contract will be furnished. In 
the case at bar it is necessarily in1plied in the contract 
that if Producers Life Insurance Co1npany did not as-
sume the contract at the expiration of the five years, it 
would be the responsibility of Producers to do so, and as 
above stated Producers has assumed said responsibility, 
and under such conditions as is· stated in Wood & Co. v. 
Van Deursen, et al., supra, such a contract does not 
lack mutuality. 
Another case in point is Hartntan v. San Pedro 
Commercial Co., 153 Pac. (2d) 212, 66 Cal. App. 935. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RETURN OF 
PREMIUMS PAID WITH INTEREST BECAUSE THE POLI-
CIES ISSUED WERE ULTRA VIRES. 
Appellants, as set forth in page 6 of their Brief, 
contended in their 1notion to rescind the Coutt's order 
of dismissal that the insurance schen1e of Producers was 
ultra vires the Insurance Company's Charter. Appel-
lants rnention this 1natter in their Brief, but do not sepa-
rately set it out as a ground for reversing the order of 
the trial court. However, respondents desire to call the 
Court's attention to the fact that the contracts of appel-
lants with Producers are now fully executed. Each of the 
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appellants lapsed his policy by failure to pay premiurns 
as they fell due. During the period of tirne that the poli-
cies 'vere in force appellants were protected, and their 
beneficiaries would have been paid the face arnount of 
their policies in the event of death. 
Granted for the sake of argurnent that the contracts 
\Vere invalid, the la'v of the rnatter of the return of con-
sideration for an ultra vires contract is stated in 7 Fletch-
er Cyclopedia, Corporations, 652, Sec. 3497, as follows: 
''When an ultra vires contract has been fully 
perfor1ned on both sides neither party can nlain-
tain an action to set aside the transaction or to 
recover what has been parted with. In other 
words, neither a court of law nor a court of equity 
\\rill interfere in such a case to deprive either the 
corporation or the other party of rnoney or other 
property acquired under the contract. This rule 
is well settled." 
However, respondent does not concede that the is-
suance of the policies were ultra vires n1erely because 
the Articles of Incorporation of Producers states that 
its purpose is to form a rnutual benefit insurance com-
pany not for pecuniary profit. The Company was cre-
ated for the purpose of issuing insurance policies. The 
i1nmaterial matters set forth in Appellants' Brief, pages 
27 to 33, do not disclose any practice contrary to the 
stated purpose of a co1npany to operate not for pecuniary 
profit. All insurance companies have expenses and all 
insurance companies attempt to accumulate reserves and 
surpluses for the protection of their policy holders. This 
is all that Producers have done. A true recital of the 
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conduct of the business and of the operations of Pro-
ducers will con1pare favorably with the operatjons of any 
other life insurance company of the sa1ne age. 
POINT IV. 
THE POLICIES ISSUED TO APPELLANTS \\TERE NOT 
VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE OF ILLEGALITY OR DIS-
CRIMINATION AND APPELLAN:TS ARE NOT ENTITLED 
TO RETURN OF PREMIUMS PAID UPON THE GROUND 
THAT SAID POLICIES WERE VOID AB INITIO. 
The crux of this case is the matter discussed under 
this point. 
Appellants contend that, since the insurance was 
written in connection with the sale of stock, the sarne 
having been prohibited by statute, the contract of insur-
ance is, therefore, void ab initio, and that the premiums 
paid are returnable with interest. 
All contracts which are prohibited by statute are 
not necessarily void. The case of Neil v. Utah Wholesale 
Grocery, 210 Pac. 201, 61 Utah 22, follows the general 
rule on this subject. The Court in that case, quoting from 
Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa at page 658, states: 
" 'There is no doubt that the well settled 
general rule is that, when a statute prohibits or 
attaches a penalty to the doing of any act, the act 
is void and 'vill not be enforced, nor wHl the law 
assist one to recover money or property which he 
has expended in the unlawful execution of it, or, 
in other 'vords, a penalty implies a prohibition, 
though there are no prohibitory words in the 
statute, and the prohibition makes the act illegal 
and void. (Citing cases) But, notwithstanding 
this general rule, it must be apparent to every 
legal mind that, when a statute annexes a penalty 
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for the doing of an act, it does not always imply 
such a prohibition, as will render the act void. 
Suppose, for instance, the act itself expressly 
provided that the penalty annexed should not 
have the effect of rendering the act void. Surely 
in such case the courts would not give such force 
to the legal in1plication, under the general rule 
above quoted as to override the express negation 
of it in the statute itself. '11hen, upon this conclu-
sion, we are prepared for the next step, which is 
equally plain, that if it is 1nanifest fron1 the lan-
guage of the statute or from its subject-matter 
and the plain intent of it, that the act was not to 
be made void, but only to punish the person doing 
it with the penalty prescribed, it is equally clear 
that the courts would readily construe the statute 
in accordance with its language and its plain 
intent.'" 
In the sa1ne case the Court stated : 
''The same principle is announced by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Harris v. 
Runnels, 12 How. 79, 13 L. Ed. 901. The second 
and third headnotes to that case are as follows: 
" 'Where a statute prohibits an act or annexes 
a penalty to its co1nmission, it is true that the act 
is made unlawful, but it does not follow that the 
unlawfulness of the act \vas 1neant by the Legis-
lature to avoid a contract made in contravention 
of it. 
" 'Where a statute is silent, and contains 
nothing from which the contrary can properly be 
inferred, a contract in contravention of it is void. 
But the whole statute must be examined in order 
to decide whether or not it does contain anything 
"froin which the contrary can be properly in-
ferred." ' " 
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Respondents again call attention to Sections of the 
Insurance Code: 31-19-35; 31-19-19; 31-19-16, and 31-19-
18, referred to above as typical of the spirit of the Code 
and which provide against declaring insuranee policies 
void for violations of various provisions of the Code. 
The rule is stated in 12 A.J. 6'54 as follows: 
"Where a statute prohibits an act or annexes 
a penalty for its commission, it does not follow 
that the unla,vfulness of the act was meant to 
avoid contracts made in contravention of it, but 
the whole statute must be examined to discover 
whether it intended to prevent courts of justice 
from enforcing the forbidden contracts." 
In this connection the following cases are in point : 
Union Nat. Bank v. Mathews, 98 U.S. 621, 26 L. 
Ed. 188; 
Union Gold Min. Co. v. Rocky Mountain Nat. 
Bank, 96 U.S. 640, 24 L. Ed. 648; 
A. C. Frost & Co. v. Gauer d'Alene Mines Corp., 
98 P. (2d) 965, 61 Ida. 21. Reversed in 61 S. 
Ct. 414, 312 U.S. 38, 85 L. Ed. 500. 
As the court stated in In re Peterson's Estate, 42 
N.W. (2d) 59: 
"Where the language of a statute is not ex-
plicit and admits of construction the courts in de-
termining legislative intent will consider the 
occasion and the necessity for the law, mischief 
to be remedied, object to be obtained, and conse-
quences of a particular interpretation. Where the 
legislature has carefully designated the offense, 
offender and the penalty and has made specific 
provisions to insure enforcement, the inference is 
that the legislature has dealt with the subject com-
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pletely and did not intend in addition thereto that 
by 1nere irnplication the drastic consequences of 
invalidity should be visited upon the victim of the 
offender." 
The sections of the statute \vhich appellants contend 
\vere violated and \vhich particularly render the insur-
ance policies void for illegality are Sections 31-7-17 and 
31-27-15, U.C.A. 1953. 
Section 31-7-17 provides, arnong other things, that no 
insurance cornpany or any officer or agent thereof shall 
give or offer to give as an induce1nent to the purchase of 
in~urance any rebate of the premiurn, nor give, sell or 
purchase or offer to give, sell or purchase as an induce-
ntent to the purchase of, insurance or in c.onjunction 
therewith, any stocks. ~rhe penalty for the violatjon of this 
section as set forth therein is that every officer or agent 
\vho violates the section is guilty of a rnisdemeanor and it 
shall be the duty of the Cornrnissioner upon bejng satis-
fied that any insurance company or agent has violated 
any provisions of this section to revoke the certificate 
of authority of the con1pany or agent so offending. Sec-
tion 31-27-15 provides that no insurer or agent shall, as 
an inducement for the purchase of insurance offer to sell 
in any manner any shares of stock or other securities. 
A'-Jection 31-27-14 provides that no insurer or agent shall, 
as an jnducen1ent to purchase insurance, offer, allow or 
pay to the insured any rebate. Section 31-27-16' provides 
that the Comrnissioner shall revoke the certificate of au-
thority or licenses of any insurer or agent guilty of vio-
lating any provision contained in 31-27-14, (on rebates), 
and 31-27-15, (on sale of stock in connection \vith insur-
ance). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
Respondent calls the attention of the Court to the 
foregoing for the reason that rebating and the sale of 
stock in connection with insurance are treated together 
in Section 31-7-17; and Section 31-27-15 (on sale of stock), 
and Section 31-27-14 (on rebating), have the same 
penalties for violation as set forth in Section 31-27-16. 
Since the two subj-ects - sale of stock with policies 
and rebating are covered by the same and consecutive 
sections, and the san1e penalties provided for the viola-
tion of each, respondents submit that the authorities up-
on the subject of rebating are pertinent in considering 
the matter of sale of stock with policies. 
Counsel has been unable to find any cases directly 
passing upon the question of whether or not a policy 
sold in connection with stock is void. However, the cases 
are numerous on the matter of rebating and the effect 
of rebating on the insurance sold in connection therewith. 
The law in connection with this matter is stated in 
44 C.J.S. 1310, Section 342, as follows: 
"Ordinarily the effect of making a discrimi-
nation or rebate in connection with insurance pre-
miums in violation of statutes condemning such 
practice is to subject the guilty agent or insurance 
company to a penalty of criminal punishment as 
discussed supra and to invalidate the discrimina-
tory agreement or contract for rebate and a note 
or check given in connection therewith but not to 
invalidate the insurance policy." (Italics ours) 
Cases cited in footnote 38 on page 1311, 44 C.J.S., include 
among others : 
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Meridian Life Ins. Co. r. Dean) G2 So. 90, 182 
Ala. 127; 
Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v .. Patton) 110 S.W. (2d) 
526, 194 Ark. 987 ; 
.r1rnerican Nat. Ins. Co. 'U. Brrown) 201 S.W. 326, 
179 Ky. 711; 
Landau v. N.Y. Life Ins. Cu.) 203 S.W. 1003, 199 
Mo. App. 544; and 
Ashton Jenkins Ins. Co. v. Layton Sugar Co.) 
39 P. (2d) 701, 85 Utah 333. 
In Ashton Jenkins Ins. Co. v. Layton Su,gar Co.) 
supra, the court said: 
"The agree1nent to pay at the 42-cent rate did 
not render the contract void. The statute provides 
a penalty for an insurance co1npany, its officers 
or agents, violating any of the provisions of the 
act. It was not conte1nplated by the statute that 
the insurance company could enter into such an 
agree1nent and then take advantage of it by say-
ing that the agree1nent was void. Whether or not 
the plaintiff violated the statute we are not called 
upon to decide. It is clear fron1 the evidence that 
the assured was not involved or affected by any 
guilt of plaintiff. Certainly, if plaintiff were 
guilty of violating the statute this court would not 
permit it to set up its own guilt or wrong to en-
rich itself." 
The court then cites several cases, the first of which 
is Way 1:. Pac. Lbr. & Timber Co.) 74 Wash. 332, 133 P. 
595. The following citation fron1 this case is in point: 
"Plaintiff's error lies in the assun1ption that 
the contract between the co-partnership and the 
defendant was void, whereas, the rule is that a 
contract which violates . a statutory regulation 
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of business is not void unless 1nade so by the 
terms of the act. 'It is a general proposition sus-
tained by the weight of authority that where a 
statute imposes a penalty for failure to comply 
with statutory requirements, the penalty so pro-
vided is exclusive of any other.' LaFrance Fire 
Engine Co. v. Mt. Vernon, 9 Wash. 142, 37 P. 287, 
38 P. 80; Horrell v. Cal. etc. Ass'n, 40 Wash. 531, 
82 P. 889. The statute strikes no blow at the busi-
ness of insurance, neither does it assun1e to void 
contracts. Its purpose is to regulate, not to pro-
hibit. 
" 'vVhen a statute is * * * a regulation of a 
traffic or business, and not to prohibit it alto-
gether, whether a contract which violates the 
statute shall be treated as wholly void, will de-
pend on the intention expressed in the particu-
lar statute. Unless the contrary intention is mani-
fest the contract will be valid.' Sutherland Statu-
tory Construction, Sec. 366." 
Probably the leading case on this rnatter is the case 
of Laun v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 N.W. 660, 131 Wis. 
555. The whole opinion is worthy of being quoted. One 
citation from this case reads : 
"We must hold that, considering the subject-
matter of this legislation, the relations of other 
non-offending policy holders to the corporation 
and its funds, the feature of the statute permitting 
rebates if written in the policy and the particular 
consequences pre·scribed by the statute for its vi-
olation falling only upon one of the parties to the 
prohibited transaction, the contract of insurance 
itself is neither illegal nor invalid and that the 
plaintiff received in consideration of his premi-
ums paid from the Conservative Life Insurance 
Con1pany a valid policy of life insurance and that 
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he consequently cannot reeover back his prerniums 
or any part thereof." 
In this case, Laun v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
the Court stated that since the cornpany wa8 a mutual 
insurance company, any refund of premiun1 paid to 
plaintiff who had received his protection for son1e years 
would by so rnuch dilninish the interest of the other non-
offending policy holders in the assets of the corporation. 
This is the rnatter referred to in the citation above "con-
sidering * * * the relations of other non-offending policy 
holders to the corporation and its funds." 
This is a rnatter of great in1portance in the case at 
bar. If appellants are successful in recovering back all 
premiums paid "\vith interest, there is no doubt that 
· numerous other policy holders who have, during the past 
five years lapsed their policies and possibly so1ne of the 
present policy holders whose insurance is still in force, 
will attempt to recover all premiun1s paid with interest. 
Approxirnately twenty rnillion dollars of insurance was 
written in connection with the sale of stock. There is yet 
in force approxiruately nine 1nillion dollars of such in-
surance owned by approximately 1800 policy holders. 
The total insurance in force in the con1pany is now ap-
proxirnately seventeen rnillion dollars, and Producers 
has approxirnately 4000 policy holders. Thus, if a con-
siderable percentage of those who have purchased 
Founders Policies were to recover back all premiurn~ 
paid it would result in great injustice to policy holders 
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who have kept their insurance in force. 
The following quotation is fro1n Anterican Nat. Ins. 
Co. v. Brown, 201 S.W. 326, 179 I-cy. 711: 
"Insurance companies are engaged in a pub-
lic business and upon grounds of public policy 
insurance contracts that may, in preli1ninary ver-
bal arrangements between soliciting agent and the 
insured, have been tainted with the vice of rebat-
ing should, when fully executed and reduced 
to writing be held valid as between the insured 
and the insurance company neither of them being 
allowed to defeat the contract in any part upon 
the ground that it was secured in the manner 
stated in violation of the statute. (Citing cases)" 
In the case of Douglas v. Mutual Benefit 1-Iealth and 
Accident Assn., 76 Pac. (2d) 453, 42 N.M. 190, the fol-
lowing headnotes reflect the decision of the Court: 
"Headnote 16. One of the objects of the in-
surance statute is to prevent splitting of commis-
sions with insured or someone else who may 
assist agent, but it was not intended that insur-
ance contract made in its violation should be in-
valid. 
"Headnote 17. The statutes prohibiting issu-
ance of insurance policies until schedules of rates 
and forms have been filed with the Superintend-
~nt of Insurance, prohibiting variations from 
published rates, and requiring written policies, 
do not invalidate oral insurance contracts." 
t-fhus, it appears by the cases, including the case of 
Ashton Jenkins Ins. Co. v. Layton Sugar Company, 
supra, from our own court, that a policy written in viola-
tion of the statute against rebates, does not render the 
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policy invalid, and as heretofore pointed out the statute 
on rebating and the statute on selling stock with insur-
ance were written together and apparently the sante 
penalty was intended to be imposed in both instances. 
The respondent 1nakes no clain1 that the Trust 
Agreement, under "\vhich dividends were accumulated 
to be used for the purchase of stock, is not illegal and 
void. At the hearing of this rnatter in the trial court 
respondent admitted that the Trust Agreen1ent for the 
accumulation of funds for the purchase of stock was in-
valid, and that plaintiffs were entitled to the return of 
dividends so used for the purchase of stock. Respondent 
tendered checks to appellants in the a1nounts of such 
dividends and requested the stock in exchange therefor. 
Appellants refused to deliver the stock in exehange for 
the checks. r~rhe checks and the stock are now filed in 
this case and respondent stands ready at any time to 
return to appellants, or any other purchasers of stock, 
the amounts so paid to them and applied on the purchase 
of the stock upon the condition only that the stock so 
purchased be returned to the Company. 
Appellants are not entitled to the return of their 
premiums. The policies are not void. Producers has 
carried protection upon its policy holders to the amount 
of millions of dollars of insurance, and has paid claims 
upon said insurance totaling approximately $4-2,000.00 to 
the end of 1954. The Company has never denied the 
validity of said insurance or attempted to defeat any 
claim thereon. 
Upon the question of return of prerniu1ns the law 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
is stated in 44 C.J.S. 1394, Section 407, as follows: 
"The general rule is that insured can recover 
premiums paid by him, if, without fault on his 
part, the risk has never attached since in such 
case the company has furnished no consideration 
for the premium. 
"Insured is , entitled to a return of the pre-
mium paid where, without fault or fraud on his 
part, no risk has attached and the co1npany has 
been subjected to no liability, as where no bind-
ing contract of insurance was effected or the 
policy was void ab initio, since in such cases there 
has been no consideration for the payment of the 
premiums." 
The rule is also stated in 44 C.J.S. 1389, Section 
406) as follows : 
"The general rule, in the absence of statutory 
or contract provision to the contrary, is that there 
can be no return of premium once the risk has at-
tached and benefit has been derived from the con-
tract since in such cases the premium is consid-
ered earned." 
On this subject, appellants, at page 42 of their Brief, 
quote from 3 Couch on Insurance, 2353, Section 710, as 
follo,vs: 
"6. A policy of insurance may be void ab 
initio * * * for illegality, the parties not being in 
pari delecto ; * * * in all such cases the premium 
is returnable * * *. It has also been said that if 
the policy is invalid and the insured was guilty of 
no fraud in procuring it, the premium is return-
able." 
The full quotation is as follows : 
"A policy of insurance may be void ab initio 
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and the risk never attached, there being no fault 
of the insured as in case of breach of warranty, 
whereby no liability is ever incurred by the in-
surer; or there may be an entire want of interest; 
or the policy may be void for illegality, the parties 
not being in pari delecto, or it may be void ab 
initio by some act or omission of the insurer - in 
all of which cases the premium is returnable." 
A reading of the cases given as the footnote to the above 
citation from 3 Couch 2353, Section 710, will disclose that 
every such case involves a situation in which no risk ever 
attached to the insurance company. 
The following is a quotation from 3 Couch 2353, Sec-
tion 709, the section preceding the one from which appel-
lants quote in part. That section reads : 
"In the absence of statutory or contract pro-
vision to the contrary if a legal risk has once at-
tached or commenced there can be no apportion-
ment or return afterward of the premiurn so far 
as a particular risk is concerned. And diminution 
in its duration has no effect to decrease the 
amount stipulated as the premiurn or price for 
renewing the risk, but it is sufficient to preclude 
a return that the insurer has been liable for any 
period, however short." 
Two companion cases from Kansas are directly 
in point. These cases are: Olson v. Western Automobile 
Ins. Co., 115 Kan. 227, 222 Pac. 104, and Walters v. 
Western Automobile Ins. Co., 116 Kan. 40-t, 226 Pac. 746. 
The defendant, a mutual automobile liability insur-
ance company, had issued policies of insurance to the 
rnembers of a club known as the Inter-Insurance Ex-
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change of Chicago, Illinois, "'\vith 1nore coverage and for 
less pren1ium than to its other policy holders, and had 
not had its policy approved by the Insurance Superin-
tendent of Kansas in violation of the statutes. The In-
surance Superintendent ordered defendant to cancel all 
policies issued to Inter-Insurance Exchange club mem-
bers. In the first case cited the Court said: 
"Therefore, doing business by use of a policy 
not approved by the Superintendent of Insurance 
is doing business without authority and contrary 
to law. The Superintendent of Insurance had not 
approved the form of policy issued to members 
of the automobile club, and his direction to cancel 
had back of it the common sanction of revocation 
of the company's certificate of authority to trans-
act business." 
In the second case, the plaintiff brought the action 
to recover all premiums paid by him on the ground that 
the policies were illegal and void and had afforded him 
no protection. Judgment was rendered in the trial court 
in favor of defendant, the Court declaring the policies 
to have been based upon a valid consideration and plain-
tiff appealed. 
The Supre1ne Court affirmed the trial court and 
said: 
"In the opinion (Olson v. Western Auto-
mobile Ins. Co.) it was said that the policies were 
unlawful and that doing business by use of such 
policies was doing business without authority and 
contrary to law, pages 230, 231. The plaintiff in 
the present case relies upon the language as sup-
porting his contention that the policies afforded 
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no consideration for the money paid for the1n and 
therefore that he is entitled to its return. * * *. 
"* * * The Court did not decide, did not say, 
and did not intend to suggest, that the policies 
so long as they remained outstanding were void 
or unenforceable. Throughout the opinion the 
fact that before the cancellation of the policies 
their holders were members of the company was 
fully recognized. The terms 'unlawful' as applied 
to the policies, and 'contrary to law' as applied 
to the doing of business by means of such policies, 
are to be interpreted in the light of the facts of 
the case in which they were used. The conduct 
was merely irregular, rather than illegal in such 
a sense as to render the result void. The policies 
held by the plaintiff were valid contracts as be-
tween him and the company until they were can-
celled. Had a loss occurred, the company could 
have been compelled to pay. The earned portion 
of the premium belongs to the company in return 
for the protection afforded, which constituted a 
valuable consideration for the pay1nent." 
Appellants submit that the great a1nount of insur-
ance written by Producers has been in force at all times 
that the policy holders have paid the preinimus thereon. 
Under the law the risk having attached there can be no 
return of the premiurn. Respondents subn1it that it has 
not been the intention of the legislature to invalidate 
insurance because it was written in connection with a 
rebate or in connection with the sale of stock. The in-
surance business is one to be protected, fostered and en-
couraged by the courts, and to accomplish this purpose 
the laws regulating insurance have been written. 
Appellants complain that the Commissioner did not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
invoke the penalty provided in Section 31-7-17, against 
Producers, that is, the revocation of Producers' License. 
This Court commented upon the 1natter of the re-
vocation of Producers' license by the Comntissioner of 
Insurance in its decision in 271 Pac. (2d) 844, 2 Utah 
(2d) 205, as follows: 
"The fact that the insurance corn1nissioner 
has allowed these companies to engage in the sale 
of stock with insurance policies for nearly two 
years might mitigate against the imposition of the 
penalty if the commission sought to exact it but 
cannot control in the interpretation of the statute." 
The following quotation from Utah Association of 
Life Underwriters v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 58 
Utah 579, 200 Pac. 673, supports the position of the trial 
court that most of the n1atters set forth in plaintiffs' 
complaint are matters for the Insurance Commissioner. 
In that case, Judge Frick, speaking for the court, said: 
"While there are other objections raised by 
plaintiff's counsel, yet those all relate to the rela-
tionship of the company with the Mountain States 
Service Company and a trust con1pany, and thus 
come within the jurisdiction of the commissioner 
and not within the jurisdiction of this eourt. If 
such relationship militate against the stability or 
welfare of the company or against the best inter-
ests of its policy holders the commissioner, and 
not the courts, must correct the evil. He is given 
ample power to do so." 
It is interesting to note that in that case the court 
revoked the license of the defendant insurance company, 
~fountain States Life Ins. Co., as the appellants complain 
that the Commissioner should have done in the case at 
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bar, but which he failed to do. ·However, on re-hearing 
Judge Frick stated : 
"There is Inerit in counsel's request that the 
judgment of the court be modified. As the judg-
Inent now stands the license or per1nit of the com-
pany to transact business in this state is uncon-
ditionally annulled and set aside without giving 
it any opportunity to co1nply with the provisions 
of our statutes and the further order of the coin-
missioner. The judgment is, therefore, too sweep-
ing. The judgment should be and the same is 
hereby modified as follows : 
"That the order of the co1nmissioner granting 
the company a license or permit to transact the 
business of life insurance in this state is set aside 
and annulled; provided, however, that the com-
pany is hereby granted leave to apply to the com-
missioner under its original application for a li-
cense or permit to transact the business aforesaid 
in this state in case it shall comply with the pro-
visions of our statute and \vith the conditions 
imposed in this opinion and with the lawful orders 
of the commissioner." 
The law under which the decision was rendered in 
[Jtah Association of Life [Jnderwriters v. Mountain 
States Life Ins. Co., supra, provided that the license of 
the co1npany should be revoked for violation of the pro-
vision prohibiting the sale of stock with life insurance. 
As soon as the Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
the case involving Producers, Producers inunediately 
discontinued the sale of stock. Pursuant to the ruling 
of the court in Utah Association of Life Underwriters v. 
111 ountain States Insurance Co., there is no reason why 
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the Connnissioner should invoke his power to revoke the 
license of Producers, and as before 1nentioned this Court 
in the recent case involving Producers indicated that, 
considering the fact that for two years the company had 
operated under a license from the Con1missioner, it 
would mitigate against his revoking the license of Pro-
ducers. 
From the statutes in question and the rulings of the 
Court, it appears that this Court has not intended to 
prevent the writing of insurance, but to regulate it in 
accordance with the provisions of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the decision of 
the trial court was correct and that the appeal of appel-
lants should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERSON, 
Attorney for Respondents, 
627 Continental Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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